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a b s t r a c t
Evaluating dependability of complex systems requires the evolution of the system states over time to be
analysed. The problem is to develop modelling approaches that take adequately the evolution of the
different operating and failed states of the system components into account. The Fault Tree (FT) is a well-
known method that efﬁciently analyse the failure causes of a system and serves for reliability and
availability evaluations. As FT is not adapted to dynamic systems with repairable multi-state compo-
nents, extensions of FT (eFT) have been developed. However efﬁcient quantitative evaluation processes
of eFT are missing. Petri nets have the advantage of allowing such evaluation but their construction is
difﬁcult to manage and their simulation performances are unsatisfactory. Therefore, we propose in this
paper a new powerful process to analyse quantitatively eFT. This is based on the use of PN method,
which relies on the failed states highlighted by the eFT, combined with a new analytical modelling
approach for critical events that depend on time duration. The performances of the new process are
demonstrated through a theoretical example of eFT and the practical use of the method is shown on a
satellite-based railway system.
1. Introduction
In order to satisfy user requirements, the conﬁguration of technical
systems becomes more and more complex and is the combination of
multiple sub-systems. In the railway context for example, the Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is an advantageous solutions for
on-board localisation units as it offers an interoperable worldwide
solution and as it reduces infrastructure costs. However, numerous
studies [1,7] emphasised the necessity of reinforcing the performances
of GNSS localisation units by other sensors when they are used in
safety applications. Numerous combinations between GNSS and other
kinds of sensors, such as odometer/ tachometer, Inertial Navigation
System (INS) or Eddy Current Sensor (ECS) are considered. In this
context, the GaLoROI project (Galileo Localisation for Railway Opera-
tion Innovation), which aims at developing a certiﬁable, safety-
relevant, and satellite-based localisation unit for low density railway
lines, is ongoing. The operation principle of GaLoROI is to combine
satellite positioning data with satellite-independent data, here pro-
vided by an ECS. This combination poses multiple challenges when
analysing and evaluating the system dependability. In fact, it is
necessary to provide an efﬁcient analysis method that can evaluate
the behaviour of complex systems.
Using popular, simple and standard notation, the Fault Tree (FT)
[6] method provides an ideal framework for deductive analyses of
causal relationships between a system fault and associated failure
events. It also allows the calculation of probabilities related to the
combinatorial logic of several associated gates. Therefore, it is
suitable for both qualitative, quantitative analyses and is widely
used in reliability and safety studies. For example, a recent study
[25] uses the FT approach with customer weighted values of
component failures frequencies and downtimes for predicting
customer reliability of a distribution power. However, FT analysis
is based on the assumption that all components must be in
boolean state (working or failed) and that component failure
events are pairwise stochastically independent. These assump-
tions allows the evaluation of the system unreliability using the
combinatorial method but is not sufﬁcient to capture real beha-
viours of complex systems.
By deﬁning additional gates, an extension of the FT, called
Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT), was ﬁrst proposed in [5] to attain a
higher level of system dependability analysis. This method that was
then developed in numerous studies [2,18,10,19,26] allows failure
sequences, functional dependent failures and presence of spare
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components to be captured. However, these studies do not consider
the components having multi-states due to degradation processes
and time conditions of the causes that lead to critical consequences.
Refs. [4,11,12] presented another extended FT, called multi-state
Fault Tree (mFT). This mFT allows considering degraded compo-
nents whose states are stochastically dependent and also allows
taking into account the repair events [4].
On the other hand, extensions of FT with time parameters (time
conditions of event duration that lead to critical consequences, delay
time between cause and effect) are useful for the dependability
analysis of technical systems. Ref. [22] expressed quantitative time
relations between causes and effects by deﬁning numerous addi-
tional temporal gates. This extension is called Temporal Fault Tree
(TFT). Ref. [13] also considered the time relation between causes and
effects using State-Event Fault tree (SEFT). For this extended FT, inputs
of gates are both instantaneous events and states that last over a
period of time. It allows addressing dynamic behaviours that depend
on event sequences and considers the duration time conditions of
events. Ref. [15] presented Time dependencies Fault Tree (TdFT) and
focused on the timing analysis of the hazard events. In this last paper,
events are not considered as instantaneous but are expressed by
their duration times. The authors then deﬁne the causal gates
characterised by the delay times between causes and consequences.
For dependability analysis of complex technical systems, such
as the GaLoROI localisation system, it is necessary to provide an
efﬁcient method that permits to:
1. consider the repairable multi-state components,
2. take into account sequence dependent behaviours of a system,
3. examine duration conditions of the causes that lead to critical
events.
Therefore, we follow the research directions of [2,4,5,13,15,22] and
present in this paper the extended Fault Tree (eFT) that combines
advantages of these above FT models for qualitative dependability
analysis. In order to ﬁnd the most appropriate method for evaluating
this eFT, a survey of existing methods is examined in Section 2. After a
discussion, the necessity for developing a new evaluation process,
which is based on the Petri net (PN) modelling of critical events due to
the duration of degraded states of sub-system, is highlighted. This
modelling process is presented in Section 3 and is performed by two
steps:
1. An analytical approach is developed in order to directly
calculate the probability distribution function (pdf) of critical
events stemming from the duration of a particular state.
2. Based on the pdf, an algorithm is proposed to sample the
occurrence time of these critical events.
Then, the last part of Section 3 aims at proving the accuracy and at
showing the efﬁciency of our new evaluation process. Moreover, the
performance of our approach is illustrated one more time when
considering a practical example, the GaLoROI system in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusion and the further research
works.
2. Methods for evaluating extended Fault Trees
2.1. Overview of existing methods for evaluating the Fault Trees and
extended Fault Trees
Two main approach types are employed in order to evaluate
the FT and its extensions:
1. Analytic approaches aim at giving precise and reliable results,
but it is not enough efﬁcient for taking into account multiple
complex behaviours of systems.
2. Modelling and simulation approaches aim at capturing the
behaviours of complex systems, but their results are less precise.
2.1.1. Analytic approaches
2.1.1.1. Combinatorial methods for evaluating mFT. As long as there
are no additional stochastic interdependencies between the com-
ponents, the multi-state Fault Tree (mFT) can still be qualitatively
analysed using the combinatorial methods. In earlier studies
[11,12], the authors extended the combinatorial method of FT.
For that, they deﬁned discrete function characterising the relations
between inputs and outputs of combinatorial gates in order to
quantitatively analyse mFT. This method is only appropriate for a
static system, i.e. a system that is examined without considering
the possible evolution of its states over time.
2.1.1.2. Methods for evaluating DFT. When considering stochastic
interdependencies between components, such as the order in which
stochastic fault events occur, the combinatorial models are not
appropriate. In order to quantitatively evaluate a DFT, [5,19] generate
all the possible system states and stochastic transitions between states,
i.e. the Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) of the system. This is
an efﬁcient method to examine the dependencies of stochastic events
or component states. However, this method presents the following
drawbacks:
1. the number of basic events of the DFT can lead to an explosion
of the state space of the CTMC.
2. the analytic evaluation is based on the assumption that all transi-
tions between states follow exponential probability distributions.
3. it is difﬁcult to take into account the maintenance information.
In order to reduce the state space explosion problem of CTMC, [10]
presented a modular approach for identifying and solving the
independent sub-trees. This approach is appropriate for fault trees
whose a small part is dynamic in nature. Different techniques are
applied to each sub-tree depending on its characteristics (static or
dynamic) and the solutions are integrated to get the results for the
Notation in this paper.
S State space of the component
i Degraded state whose the sojourn time that satisﬁes duration time
condition can lead to a critical event (CE)
n Number of sojourn periods in a degraded state, which lead to a critical
event (CE)
m Discretisation period
QCE(m) Probability that the critical event, CE is available at the m-th period,
mZn
T0 Observation period of the subsystem output
nmiss Last period of the mission time (Tmiss)
nCE First occurrence period of the critical event (CE)
pðnCEÞ Probability distribution function (pdf) of nCE
PðnCEÞ Cumulative distribution function (cdf) of nCE
pðnlCEÞ The probability that the component leaves state i after nlCE periods
pii Probability for staying in state i after T0 s
Pto_i Column vector of size jSj $ 1 that presents the transition probabilities
from all states of the component to state i
Pfrom_i Be the row vector, of size 1$ jSj, that represents transition
probabilities from state i to all states of the component
Pocc Row vector of size 1$ jSj that presents the probability vector of initial
states of the component at t¼0
Pocc(i) Occurrence probability of state i at the initial instant
Ptrans Transition matrix of size jSj $ jSj
D1ðaÞ Probability that CE occurs for the ﬁrst time at the a-th period
(nþ1rar2nþ1) and lasts until the ðmÞ-th period
D2ðaÞ Probability that CE occurs for the ﬁrst time at the a-th period
(nþ2rarm) and also is available at the m-th period
N Large number of transition step, such as PNtransCP
Nþ1
trans
whole fault tree. When considering a large DFT whose top-node is
a dynamic gate (PAND gate–AND gate with priorities between
events for example), its sub-modules cannot be solved separately
by the above modular approach. Ref. [3] proposed to convert the
large DFT(s) into Input/Output-Interactive Markov Chains (IO-IMC)
for making quantitative analysis. The IO-IMC is an extension of
CTMC by deﬁning the causes and effects of the transitions.
In detail, a transition can be triggered by the output of another
transition in the Markov chain. The “DFT to I/O-IMC conversion”
approach efﬁciently models the complex functionality relations of
dependent events.
Likely as “CTMC conversion” approach, “DFT to I/O-IMC con-
version” approach is also based on the exponential assumption for
transition times. In reliability studies, various kinds of distribu-
tions can be assigned to component failures, such as Weibull
distribution. Ref. [18] presented an algebraic approach to over-
come the limitation of the assumption about exponential distribu-
tion. When a part of the structure function is static, its failure
probability can be determined by means of the inclusion–exclu-
sion formula. For a dynamic part of the structure function, its
failure probability can be determined by means of the probability
models provided. This approach allows quantitatively evaluating
any DFT whose basic events can be modelled with any failure
distribution but is not appropriate to take into account the repair
events or any information about maintenance process.
In a recent study, [14] proposes an approximative approach for
evaluating a DFT of water supply risks. In detail, assuming that
each component follows a Markovian process of 2 states (up and
down), they presented how to approximate the calculations of the
traditional (OR- and AND-) gates and also of the dynamic gates
(called ﬁrst and second variance AND gates). Therefore, it facil-
itates simple model building and calculations that are less com-
putationally demanding than Markov simulations.
2.1.1.3. Methods for evaluating TFT. For the quantitative analysis of
a TFT, [22] proposed to convert a TFT into a non-TFT and then to
use the combinatorial methods for solving non-TFT. In detail, each
temporal gate is replaced by a logical gate; and the events
associated with the temporal gate are replaced by one or more
events. For example, the output of the WINTHIN n gate only
happens when its input occurs within n previous time periods.
This gate can be converted into an OR gate: the output will occur
at Tk if its input occurs at Tk'n OR… OR Tk'1 OR Tk. This method is
not appropriate for a large TFT and is very difﬁcult to consider the
systems with repairable components.
2.1.2. Modelling and simulation approaches
2.1.2.1. Monte Carlo simulation for evaluating DFT. Ref. [26] prop-
osed a Monte Carlo (MC) simulation-based approach to solve a
DFT. The MC simulation is a powerful statistical method used to
solve real problems, in particular when analytical approaches are
not feasible. This method is based on the statical evaluation of
a large number of scenarios. For this reason, it cannot produce
an exact evaluation. The result accuracy strictly depends on the
number of scenarios. In detail, for each scenario, the time to failure
or the time to repair each component are stochastically generated
sequentially based on their pdf until the mission time is reached.
Then, the time proﬁles of component states (the time proﬁles of
the related gate inputs) are examined to consider if a gate output
is generated or not. The occurrence time of a gate output is
registered into the input time proﬁles of the higher level gates.
This process continues until the end of the mission time is reached
in order to examine the occurrence time of the top event in this
scenario.
2.1.2.2. Petri net modelling for evaluating FT and its extensions. Among
the modelling methods, Petri net (PN) is a graphical and mathematical
modelling tool for the description of time dependent behaviours of
systems [20] and is widely employed in dependability assessments. In
early studies, [16] described general algorithms for transforming
traditional FT into PN.
Stochastic Petri nets (SPN) are an extension of Petri nets where
the transitions ﬁre after a probabilistic delay determined by a
random variable. The SPN allows modelling complex and time-
dependent stochastic interactions between events. In [4], authors
proposed to use SPN for modelling and evaluating an extended FT
by allowing multi-state components and stochastic dependencies,
namely repair and failure dependencies. This approach is not
appropriate for a large real-world system because of the large
number of SPN places generated from the eFT model. Therefore,
the truncation, folding and modularisation approaches should be
considered for evaluating the large eFT.
Ref. [13] proposed to use Deterministic Stochastic Petri net
(DSPN), an extension of SPN that also allows considering determi-
nistic delay, in order to quantitatively analyse the State Event FT
(SEFT). The states and events of SEFT are ﬁrst translated into DSPN
places and transitions. Then, the SEFT gates are translated by the
corresponding DSPN structure. The advantages of this method are
the ability to model real aspects of systems, such as the stochastic
dependencies between events, the time conditions between
causes and effects and also the maintenance process. However,
as the technique to evaluate dependability using DSPN is based on
the MC simulation, this method also presents the drawbacks of the
MC simulation.
For evaluating the repairable DFT, [2] proposed to use high level
Coloured Petri net (CPN), an extension of PN that allows to make
hierarchical descriptions for models using the deﬁnition of differ-
ent data types and data manipulation. The static gates (AND, OR,
K/N) and dynamic gates (PAND, FDEP – functional dependant gate,
SEQ – sequence enforcing gate, WSP – Warm spare gate) are
converted into CPN. Then, analysis of a DFT follows a classical
hierarchical scheme. Each independent sub-tree, called module, is
analysed in isolation. After evaluating the occurrence probability
of the top event of the module, this whole module is replaced with
a single basic event and integrated in the entire DFT.
2.1.2.3. State chart modelling for evaluating TdFT. Ref. [15] focused
on the timing qualitative analysis of the TdFT. The principal
objective is to evaluate the minimal and maximal values of event
duration times and delay times between input and output events
of causal FT gates. A new version of timed state charts (TSC) based
on the UML state-charts is proposed to solve the minimal and
maximal execution time problem.
2.2. Necessity of a new approach for modelling the critical events
stemming from the duration of a particular state
In this subsection, we discuss about the appropriate method for
evaluating an extended Fault tree to analyse the dependability of
complex multi-component systems, such as a ECS & GNSS based
localisation system. This method has to allow repairable multi-
state components, failure sequence dependencies and time
duration-dependencies to be taken into account.
Based on Table 1 that summarises the methods for solving the
extensions of FT in literature, we ﬁnd that the PN approach based
on the MC simulation [2,4,13,26] is the most appropriate approach
for evaluating an eFT of a complex system. Following the direction
of these papers, we use PN and MC simulations [21] to quantita-
tively analyse the eFT. In detail, we convert the eFT into PN using
3 following steps:
Step 1 – Inputs: model the evolution of component states over
time in PN structure.
Step 2 – Gates: translate “dynamic and temporal logic gates”
through PN structure [13,21].
Step 3 – Combination: evaluate the eFT by integrating basic events
into the inputs of “dynamic and temporal logic gates”.
However, the duration of Petri net simulations for a dependability
evaluation is an issue. In fact, as the system output strictly
depends on the states of components every small period of time
T0 s, the classical PN method [21] requires modelling the transition
of the component states every T0 s. It can cause a huge number of
unnecessary sequences that do not lead to the critical events. This
is also the common issue of dependability evaluation of technical
systems, especially when the following conditions are met:
(i) the observation period of the sub-system output, T0 is too
small when comparing to the mission time, Tmiss;
(ii) the critical events that can lead to the system failure state are
caused due to the duration of sub-system's deterioration states
(instead of the failure event that occurs at a given instant).
Therefore, a new approach that allows directly modelling the
critical events stemming from the duration of a particular state is
necessary.
3. New process for evaluating eFT and application
to a theoretical case
3.1. Evaluation of the probability distribution function of the critical
event stemming from the duration of a particular state
Let us consider the following state space for a component:
S : f1;2;3…sg. The probability vector of initial states at t¼0, Pocc, is
a row vector with the dimension 1$ jSj. The component states are
observed every period of T0 s. The transition between states of the
component follows a time-homogeneous Markov chain with the
transition matrix, Ptrans, of size jSj $ jSj (i.e. the transition matrix
Ptrans is the same after each step). Ref. [27] can be consulted for the
mathematical background of the basic calculations performed on
the matrix transition of Markov Chain. Recall that when PðnÞtrans is
the matrix of n-step transition probabilities, we have
PðnþmÞtrans ¼ P
ðnÞ
trans $ P
ðmÞ
trans
where $ represents matrix multiplication. Hence, the n-step
transition matrix may be obtained by multiplying the matrix Ptrans
by itself n times. On the other hand, the occurrence probability
vector of states at t¼m, Pocc(m), is given by
PoccðmÞ ¼ Pocc $ P
ðmÞ
trans
When considering a critical event, CE that occurs when the
component stays in state i for more than n periods, nZ2, the
probability that CE is available at them-th period,mZnþ1 is given by
QCEðmÞ ¼ Pocc $ P
ðm'n'1Þ
trans $ Pto_i * p
n
ii ð1Þ
where pii is the probability for staying in state i after T0 s and Pto_i is
the column vector of size jSj $ 1 that contains the transition prob-
abilities from all states of the state space to state i:
Pto_i ¼
p1i
…
pii
…
psi
2
6666664
3
7777775
Let nCE be the ﬁrst occurrence period of the critical event (CE), the
probability distribution function (pdf) of nCE, characterised by pðnCEÞ, is
calculated as follows:
+ CE cannot occur before n-th periods:
pðnCEÞ ¼ 0 8nCEon ð2Þ
+ CE occurs for the ﬁrst time at the n-th period when the initial
state is i and when the component stays in this state during n
Table 1
Methods for evaluating extensions of Fault Tree in literature.
Multistate
component
Repairable
component
Time cond
dependency
Failure seq
dependency
Various kinds of failure
probability distribution
Type of Fault
Tree
Analytic approach Exact evaluation
Combinatorial method (discrete function
between input & output gate)
OK Not
appropriated
Impossible Impossible OK mFT
CTMC (Continuous Time Markov Chain) Not
appropriated
Not
appropriated
Impossible OK Impossible DFT
IO-HVIC (Input/ Output Interactive Markov
chain)
Not
appropriated
OK Impossible OK Impossible DFT
Algebraic approach Not
appropriated
Not
appropriated
Impossible OK OK DFT
Combinatorial method (convert TFT into FT) OK Not
appropriated
OK (small size) OK (small size) OK TFT
Approximate analytic
Not
appropriated
OK Impossible OK Impossible DFT
Simulation approach Statistical evaluation
State chart Not
appropriated
(a)
Not
appropriated
(a)
OK (specially for
timing analysis)
OK OK TdFT
Monte Carlo Simulation & Petri Net OK OK OK OK OK mFT. DFT, TFT.
SEFT (- eFT)
a Note that the state chart can represent multi-state components and repair events, for example considering [24]. However, it directly models s speciﬁc railway system in
order to evaluate its dependability parameters but it does not perform qualitative analysis using FT. Note also that the state chart presented in [15] aims at analysing TdFT
that does not take into account repairable events and multi-state components.
periods of T0, see Fig. 1(1):
pðnCE ¼ nÞ ¼ PoccðiÞ * p
n
ii; ð3Þ
where Pocc(i) is the occurrence probability of state i at the initial
instant. In this case, QCEðnÞ ¼ pðnCE ¼ nÞ
+ The probability that CE occurs for the ﬁrst time at the (nþ1)-th
period is given by the difference between:
1. the probability that CE is available at (nþ1)-th period, noted
QCEðnþ1Þ;
2. the probability that CE occurs for the ﬁrst time at the n-th
period and lasts until the (nþ1)-th period, i.e. the compo-
nent enters in state i at the initial period and stays in this
state until (nþ1)-th period, cf. Fig. 1(2):
pðnCE ¼ nþ1Þ ¼QCEðnþ1Þ'pðnCE ¼ nÞ * pii
where QCEðnþ1Þ ¼ Pocc $ Pto_i * p
n
ii
+ More generally, the probability that CE occurs for the ﬁrst time
at the m-th period, (nþ1rmo2nþ2) is given by
pðnCE ¼mÞ ¼QCEðmÞ' ∑
m'1
a ¼ n
pðnCE ¼ aÞ * p
m'a
ii ð4Þ
+ At m¼ 2nþ2, the CE can occur at the n-th period, then
disappears at the (nþ1)-th period, and ﬁnally occurs again
at the ð2nþ2Þ-th period, see Fig. 1(3). Therefore, the prob-
ability that CE occurs for the ﬁrst time at the ð2nþ2Þ-th period
is given by
pðnCE ¼ 2nþ2Þ ¼ QCEð2nþ2Þ' ∑
2nþ1
a ¼ nþ1
D1ðaÞ'D2ðaÞ
where
– D1ðaÞ: the probability that CE occurs for the ﬁrst time at the
a-th period (nþ1rar2nþ1) and lasts until the m-th
period, m¼ 2nþ2 in this case:
D1ðaÞ ¼ pðnCE ¼ aÞ * p
ð2nþ2'aÞ
ii ð5Þ
– D2ðaÞ: the probability that CE occurs ﬁrst time at the a-th
period (nrarm'n'2) and also is available at the m-th
period. Atm¼ 2nþ2, we have a¼n; the component can stay
in state i from initial period until the ð2nþ2Þ-th period; or it
leaves the state i at nþ1 and enters again in state i at nþ2
until the ð2nþ2Þ-th period:
D2ða¼ nÞ ¼ pðnCE ¼ nÞ $ Pfrom_i $ Pto_i * p
n
ii
with Pfrom_i, the row vector of size 1$ jSj, that represents
transition probabilities from state i to all states of the state
space:
Pfrom_i ¼ ½ pi1 pi2 … pii … pis .
+ More generally, the probability that CE occurs for the ﬁrst time
at the m period (mZ2nþ2) is given by
pðnCE ¼mÞ ¼ QCEðmÞ' ∑
m'1
a ¼ m'n'1
D1ðaÞ' ∑
m'n'2
a ¼ n
D2ðaÞ ð6Þ
where D1ðaÞ is calculated by Eq. (5) and
D2ðaÞ ¼ pðnCE ¼ aÞ $ Pfrom_i $ P
ðm'a'n'2Þ
trans $ Pto_i * p
n
ii ð7Þ
When m-1, it takes many time for evaluating D2ðaÞ (8n : nr
arm'n'2) while values of D2ðaÞ can be considered as same for
aZN where N is a large number of transition steps. Therefore, in
order to reduce the iterative steps, we ﬁrstly identify N such as
PNtransCP
Nþ1
trans . Then we use N for an approximate evaluation of the
pdf of the CE. The algorithms for identifying N and for the
approximate evaluation of pðnCEÞ, 0rnCErnmiss are presented in
the Appendix (nmiss is the last period of the mission time).
When CE occurs, the system enters in the critical state until the
‘Leaving critical state’ event that occurs as soon as the component
leaves the state i. Let pðnlCE ¼mÞ be the probability that the
component leaves state i after m periods. We have
pðnlCE ¼mÞ ¼ p
m'1
ii * ð1'piiÞ ð8Þ
It is equal to the probability that the component stays in this state
during nlCE'1 periods and then leaves it at the ðnlCEÞ-th period.
3.2. Algorithm to sample the critical events
In this subsection, we present how to directly generate the time
of occurrence of the critical events (CE) for MC simulation. The ﬁrst
occurrence time of CE is at the m-th period, and the values of m
follow the discrete function based on the approach presented in
the previous subsection:
8mon : pðnCE ¼mÞ ¼ 0;
m¼ n : pðnCE ¼mÞ ¼ PoccðiÞ * p
n
ii;
nomr2nþ1 : pðnCE ¼mÞ ¼QCEðmÞ' ∑
m'1
a ¼ n
pðnCE ¼ aÞ * p
m'a
ii
8mZ2nþ2 : pðnCE ¼mÞ ¼QCEðmÞ' ∑
m'1
a ¼ m'n'1
pðnCE ¼ aÞ * p
ðm'aÞ
ii
' ∑
m'n'2
a ¼ n
pðnCE ¼ aÞ $ Pfrom_i $ P
ðm'a'n'2Þ
trans $ Pto_i * p
n
ii
Ref. [17] presents a sampling approach of a discrete distribu-
tion. Let ξ be a uniform random number, the sampling value m of
nCE is the one that satisﬁes the following relation:
∑
m'1
j ¼ 0
pðnCE ¼ jÞoξr ∑
m
j ¼ 0
pðnCE ¼ jÞ: ð9Þ
Let PðnCErmÞ be the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of nCE,
we have
PðnCErmÞ ¼ ∑
m
j ¼ 0
pðnCE ¼ jÞ: ð10Þ
Therefore, the algorithm to sample the value m of nCE for the MC
simulation is presented in Fig. 10 in the Appendix. Note that we
use the modiﬁed binary search algorithm (with ‘ﬁrst’, ‘last’,
‘middle’ being the integer variables) to ﬁnd the sampling value
m of nCE that satisfy the Eq. (9).Fig. 1. Time chart of occurrence of critical events, CE.
3.3. Validation of the new evaluation process with a theoretical eFT
In this section, we consider a theoretical example for validating
and showing the efﬁciency of our new evaluation process for
the eFT.
3.3.1. Presentation of the theoretical case and of its 3 different
evaluation processes
Let us consider a sensor system that has a multi-state compo-
nent A and component B whose time to failure follows an
exponential distribution with a failure rate of αB ¼ 10
'5=s. The
component A having the probability vector of initial states,
Pocc ¼ ½1 0 0. and the following transition matrix every T0 ¼ 1 s:
Ptrans ¼
0:8 0:1 0:1
0:2 0:5 0:3
0:1 0:3 0:6
2
64
3
75
The output of the component A will be observed every T0 s, and
then associated with the output of component B. The system
service will be considered as failed when:
1. A is in the state 2, and B is in the failed state for more than 10
periods.
2. A is in the state 3 for more than 15 periods.
In other words, for analysing system failure, two following critical
events (CE) are examined:
+ CE1 will occur if A stays in state 2 for more than 10 periods.
+ CE2 will occur if A stays in state 3 for more than 15 periods.
On the other hand, the reparation of component B is not con-
sidered in this example. This assumption allows the simpliﬁcation
of the problem and the analytic analysis to be performed in order
to compare its result with the results of several simulation
approaches. In detail, the eFT of this example, presented in
Fig. 4(I), will be quantitatively analysed using the 3 following
different processes:
1. AP1 – Classical evaluation process: Convert the eFT into PN
with the classical modelling approach for the component A as
explained in Section 2.2.
2. AP2 – New evaluation process: Convert the eFT into PN with
the newmodelling approach (presented in Sections 3.1 and 3.2)
for the critical events (CE1, CE2) of the component A.
3. AP3 – Analytic approach: Convert the eFT into a traditional FT,
following the method presented by [22].
After evaluating the pdf, the CE is considered as a basic event.
A simple eFT can be easily converted into FT, cf. Fig. 4(II).
By comparing these evaluation processes, the performance of our
process (AP2) for evaluating the eFT will be highlighted in Section
3.3.3, but ﬁrstly in next Section 3.3.2, our new modelling approach
for the CE(s) considered in this eFT will be veriﬁed.
3.3.2. Validation of the new modelling approach for the critical event
considered in the theoretical eFT
In order to prove the accuracy of our new modelling approach
for CE, we propose to use two following ways:
W1: Model the transition process of component A by a classical PN
approach (cf. the PN structure of Fig. 11 in the Appendix) in
order to evaluate the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of
CE1 and CE2; then compare these results with the formula
results (Eqs. (3)–(7)) obtained when using the approximate
evaluation algorithm (cf. Fig. 9 in the Appendix).
W2: Model directly the critical events CE1, CE2 using the sampling
method presented in Section 3.2 in order to evaluate QCE1ðtÞ
and QCE2ðtÞ (cf. the PN structure of Fig. 12) in the Appendix;
then compare these simulation results with the theoretical
results of Eq. (1).
Note that the notation of PN modelling is taken from the IEC 62551
standard [8].
These PN models are executed based on the MC simulation
that are performed on the computer Core 2 Duo P8400 @2.26 GHz,
3.45 Go RAM, using the Petri net module of GRIF platform [9].
This module allows declaring new special law proposed in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for triggering the CE transition.
The results of W1 are presented in Fig. 2. The cumulative
probabilities of CE1 (CE2) during 3600 periods obtained by both
approaches are the same. Moreover, the time to evaluate PCE by the
new simulation approach is only 4.2 s instead of 27 970 s for the
classical PN modelling approach with 3$ 107 simulation scenarios.
The results of W2 are presented in Fig. 3. The probabilities that
CE1 (CE2) occurs at the j-th period (0r jr360) obtained by the
new simulation approach ﬂuctuate around the theoretical results
QCE1ðjÞ (QCE2ðjÞ) of Eq. (1).
3.3.3. Performance of the new evaluation process for evaluating the
theoretical eFT
The probability of the service failure (the top event of the eFT) at
the end of the mission time Tmiss, obtained by these 3 evaluation
processes, is respectively presented in Table 2. We ﬁnd that the results
of the AP2 are better than the results of the AP1 when comparing
with the analytic results (AP3). Moreover, for Tmiss ¼ 10 000 s, the AP1
results cannot be obtained during 36 000 s of simulation time. Fig. 5
presents the simulation time for AP1 and AP2 (with 107 scenarios).
It highlights the performance of the new evaluation process, AP2.
In fact, when comparing with the AP1, the longer the mission time is,
the more efﬁcient the simulation time is.
4. Case study: evaluation of the eFT related to a GNSS and ECS
based localisation system
In this section, a case study of eFT is given for a GNSS &
ECS based localisation unit developed in the European project,
GaLoROI [21], taken in order to illustrate the performance of our
new approach.
4.1. Description of the system and its error conditions
The localisation unit is based on the combination between
GNSS and ECS measurements. Both the GNSS receiver and ECS
respectively provide position and velocity of the train. These
outputs are combined and matched on a digital track map in a
fusion component to process an accurate train position in real-
time. The service failure of GNSS & ECS based localisation unit can
be classiﬁed into the following cases:
+ Case A – Unavailable output
– A hardware failure of the fusion component directly causes
an interruption of the output of the data fusion and map
matching process modules.
– A software error during the fusion data process is revealed.
+ Case B – Untrustworthy position
– Unavailable ECS and GNSS data: If there is no ECS and GNSS
data for more than T1 s, the output of the fusion component
can be considered as false.
Fig. 3. Probability that critical event is available at t.
Fig. 2. Cumulative probability of the critical events.
– Unavailable GNSS data: If GNSS data are missing for more
than T2 s (ECS measurements are available) the conﬁdence
interval linked to output data will increase quickly. In that
case, the position is not trustworthy and considered as false
(T1oT2).
+ Case C – undetected position errors
– At least k consecutive position errors of the GNSS receiver
that are greater than xmetres (PEr4x) can lead to a position
error in output of the fusion component that exceeds the
user tolerance limit.
– If ECS data are missing, at least l consecutive position errors
of the GNSS receiver that are greater than x metres (PEr4x)
can lead to a position error in output of the fusion compo-
nent that exceeds the tolerance limit.
Note that due to the efﬁciency of the fusion process, the impact
of position errors at the receiver output on the global position
result will be reduced if there exists valid ECS data, thus k4 l.
The hardware failure rates of GNSS antenna, GNSS receiver, ECS,
fusion component are respectively characterised by αa, αr, αe, αf.
4.2. eFT of the system
The failures of localisation service do not only depend on the
material but also on satellite signal degradations due to the signal
propagation environment. This later poses multiple challenges
for analysing and evaluating the service failure. In fact, common
analysis approach cannot adequately take all perturbations affect-
ing GNSS signals into account, especially local impacts of railway
environments. In order to overcome this difﬁculty, we propose to
use a Markov process to model the following states of the GNSS
receiver:
1. Correctly estimated position, PErrxm.
2. Incorrectly estimated position, PEr4xm.
3. Unavailable position because of missing GNSS SIS (Signal In
Space).
4. Unavailable position because of a hardware failure.
The transitions between the states 1/2/3 only occur when no
material failure exists. Their probabilities are calculated from the
simulation data used in [1]. The transitions from these three states
to state 4 (hardware failure state) immediately occur when there
exists at least a material failure of a component. After a reparation
action, if all components are OK, the transition from state 4 to one
of the three states 1/2/3 is ﬁred.
Due to the efﬁciency of the fusion component, the degraded
states (2/3/4) of the receiver output do not immediately cause a
service failure. The critical events only occur when the condition of
the sojourn time in degraded states is satisﬁed. Then, the critical
events, such as missing GNSS SIS for more than T1 s or l consecutive
Fig. 4. AP3 – Convert a simple (I) eFT into traditional (II) FT.
Fig. 5. Simulation time for AP1 & AP2.
Table 2
Probability of service failure for the ﬁrst simple example.
Tmiss (s) 100 360 1000 3600 10 000
AP1 1:48$ 10'4 1:47$ 10'4 1:39$ 10'4 1:57$ 10'4 X
AP2 1:47$ 10'4 1:47$ 10'4 1:49$ 10'4 1:54$ 10'4 1:72$ 10'4
AP3 1:45$ 10'4 1:46$ 10'4 1:47$ 10'4 1:54$ 10'4 1:7$ 10'4
(PEr4x), are modelled using the approach proposed in Section 3
(cf. Fig. 13 presents the PN model of these critical events). Then,
these critical events can be considered as the basic events of the eFT.
The eFT of the GNSS & ECS based localisation unit is presented
in Fig. 6. Its notations are explained in Table 3.
The unavailable output (Case A) is caused by a material failure
(Basic Event 1 – BE1) or by a software error in the fusion component
(Undeveloped Event – UE). The material failure occurs with a
failure rate αf while the software error is not analysed in the
framework of this paper.
The untrustworthy position (Case B) can be caused by a lack of
both GNSS and ECS data for more than T1 s (called Intermediate
Event 1 – IE1) or by missing GNSS data for more than T2 s
(Intermediate Event 2 – IE2).
Next, the IE1 can be caused by a hardware failure of ECS and
GNSS sensors for more than T1s (IE3) or missing GNSS SIS for more
than T1 s when ECS fails (IE5). The IE3 is the output of a causal AND
gate (deﬁned in [15]) with a duration greater than T1 s. The output
of the causal AND gate only happens when its inputs occur
together during the given period of time. This causal AND gate
Table 3
Notations of the extended Fault Tree.
Basic event: Event using a primary event failure model
Undeveloped Event: Event that is yet to be developed (not used in the following fault trees)
Description Symbol: Text describing the logical result of the gate event
TRANSFER Gate: The output is used as part of a lower level tree presented in the following part
REFERENCE Gate: The output is part of an upper level tree presented in the following part
OR Gate: Output events occurs if any one of the input events occur
AND Gate: Output events occurs if all of the input events occur
CAUSAL AND Gate: Output events only happens when its inputs occur together during the given period of time
The DUR Gate: Output events only happens when its inputs occur during a given period of time.
Fig. 6. eFT of GNSS & ECS based localisation unit.
has in input the ECS failure (Basic Event 2 – BE2) and GNSS
hardware failure due to antenna failure or receiver failure (IE4).
The IE5 is the output of the AND gate having in input the DUR
gate for more than T1 s of BE2 and the missing GNSS signal in space
(SIS) for more than T1 s (BE3). The DUR gate is deﬁned by the
occurrence duration of the input during a given period of time [13].
Similarly, the IE2 is caused by a duration gate for more than T2 s
of IE4 or the critical event,missing GNSS SIS for more than T2 s (BE4).
The case C is caused by BE5 – at least k consecutive (PEr4x m)
or IE6 – at least l consecutive (PEr4x m) when ECS fails. Then, the
IE6 is the AND gate output of the ECS failure for more than duration
time of l consecutive (PEr4xm) and the k consecutive (PEr4x m).
4.3. Dependability analysis using the eFT evaluation method
For this dependability analysis, the availability and the relia-
bility of the system will be evaluated. The reliability is deﬁned as
the ability of a system to perform a required function under given
conditions for a given time interval ½0; t. [23]. In this paper, it is
expressed by the following probability:
RðtÞ ¼ PðT4tÞ ¼ 1'PðTErtÞ ð11Þ
where TE is the service failure time, i.e. the ﬁrst time the top event
of the eFT occurs; and PðTErtÞ is the system unreliability, i.e. the
cumulative probability function of the service failure until t.
The instantaneous availability is the ability of a system to be in
a state to perform required function under given conditions, at a
given instant t [23]. In this paper, it is expressed as the probability
A(t) such as
AðtÞ ¼ Pðsystem is available at tÞ ¼ 1'PðTE¼ tÞ ð12Þ
where PðTE¼ tÞ is the system unavailability at instant t, i.e. the
probability that the service failure (the top event of the eFT) occurs
at t.
The eFT of the localisation unit, presented in Fig. 6, cannot be
evaluated using the Analytic Approach (AP3) due to the complex-
ity when considering the repairable events (with Mean Time To
Repair (MTTR) is 1 h). Indeed, considering the IE3 that is the
output of the gate causal AND T1, if the repair action is not
considered, this gate can be easily converted into an AND gate
with two inputs: (1) BE2 (ECS failure) before t-T1 and (2) IE4
(GNSS hardware failure) before t-T1. Contrarily, when repairable
events are taken into account, for converting the gate CAUSAL AND
T1 into a normal AND gate, we have to consider: (a) ECS failure
event occurs the n-th time at TBE2 where TBE2 is a random time
(0oTBE2rt'T1) for all 1rnr1 and (b) IE4 event occurs the m-
th time at TIE4 where TIE4 is a random time (0oT IE4rt'T1) for all
Fig. 7. System unreliability during the mission time in different local environments.
Fig. 8. System unavailability during the mission time in different local environments.
Table 4
Input parameters for evaluating the failure service of system.
Missing time (s) & Number
of consecutive PE
T1 T2 k l
4 10 4 10
Failure rate (/10'9 per s) αa αr αe αf
1.11 1.13 0.6 1.7
1rmr1. So, the analytical evaluation for the output of this gate
becomes complicated. On the other hand, consider T0 ¼ 1 s and
Tmiss ¼ 3600 s, the AP1 results cannot be obtained in 20 000 s for
107 scenarios. Therefore, the AP2 is the most appropriate approach
for solving the eFT in order to evaluate the system dependability
during 3600 s of mission time (cf. Fig. 13).
The input parameters for the system dependability analysis are
presented in Table 4. Note that these parameters are not real
parameter of the system developed in GaLoROI project. They are
only used for illustrating the performance of our approach. In fact,
it can take into account multi-effects of the local environments on
the system dependability analysis.
The system unreliability in different local environments is
presented in Fig. 7. We ﬁnd that due to the masking phenomena
and the multipath effects undergone by the GNSS signals, the
localisation service cannot be reliable during a long time in a
woody environment.
The system unavailability in different local environments is
presented in Fig. 8. At the end of the mission time, t¼3600 s, the
system unavailability can be negligible when considering a service
realised in the urban environment (PðTE¼ 3600Þ ¼ 7:62$ 10'6) or
in the railway cutting environment (PðTE¼ 3600Þ ¼ 2:15$ 10'5).
In the woody environment, the system unavailability can be
acceptable (PðTE¼ 3600Þ ¼ 1:61$ 10'2) but should be improved
by a redundancy sensor channel.
Based on the above case study, we ﬁnd that the new evaluation
approach is powerful to analyse the dependability of a complex
system such as a GNSS-based localisation unit.
Fig. 9. Algorithm 2 – Approximative evaluation of pðnCEÞ.
5. Conclusion
In this work, an extended Fault Tree (eFT) was proposed for
qualitative analysis of complex, multi-component systems in order
to identify and then to present the causes that lead to a system
failure. In detail, it permits to consider the repairable multi-state
components and to take into account the dependencies due to the
sequences and the duration of the causes that lead to critical
consequences.
For quantitative analysis, e.g evaluating the RAMS parameters, a
survey of methods for evaluating the extended version of FT in
literature was discussed. Among these methods, PN modelling is the
most appropriate for evaluating eFT. However, as the simulation time
of this classical PN modelling method is large (due to its time-
dependent-feature), a newmodelling process using PN for evaluating
the eFT was developed. This process is based on an analytical
approach that allows directly the probability distribution function
of the occurrence time of the critical event stemming from a duration
of a particular gate to be captured. For the second step of the
evaluation process, a sampling approach for modelling these critical
events was then proposed, using its probability distribution function.
The validation of the new evaluation process (AP2) was demon-
strated by comparing its result with the one of a classical PN
modelling process (AP1) and the analytical process (AP3). In detail,
our method (AP2) gives better results than the AP1 when compar-
ing with the AP3. Moreover, if the ratio between the mission time
and the state transition period of the components is high, the use of
the AP2 signiﬁcantly reduces the simulation time.
After having enough evidences for the performance of the AP2,
we then used it for the case study that cannot be solved by the AP1
Fig. 10. Algorithm 3 – Sampling the value of nCE for MC simulation.
Fig. 11. PN structure for modelling the critical events of component A. Note that “sol2” in the label of Tr1, Tr2, Tr3 represents the ﬁring law for the transitions that only one of
the downstream places is ﬁlled after ﬁring transition with a correspondent probability. For example, the label of Tr1 means that after 1 s, the token in place 1 will stay in this
place with the probability 0.8, or will go to place 2 with the probability 0.1, or go to place 3 with the probability 0.1.
Fig. 12. New modelling method for critical events of component A. Note that Tr_CE1ðb; cÞ respectively represent the occurrences of CE1(from “OK_initial” state or from
“OK_after_CE1” state or “OK_after_CE2” state). The transition time is triggered by the special law, noted “spec 1.1E1”. The core of this law is the sampling approach presented
in Section 3.2 that is based on the pdf of CE1 calculated in Section 3. Transition “leave_CE1” is triggered by the “spec 1E2” law that is based on the sampling approach of
discrete distribution [17]. The next parameter of this transition represents the probability that the component will stay in the critical state in the next period.
Fig. 13. New modelling method for critical events of GNSS subsystem. Note that the places 2, 4, 5, 6 represent the critical events of the eFT presented in Fig. 6.
or the AP3. In detail, a numerical example of dependability
analysis for a real system – a ECS & GNSS based localisation unit
was used to illustrate the performance of our approach. It allows
multi-effects of the local environments in the system depend-
ability analysis to be taken into account.
In further works, a biasing method to reinforce the occurrence
probability of rare critical events will be considered in order to
reduce the simulation time for a large number of scenarios.
Furthermore, as soon as system tests in operational environments
will be completed, we will analyse experimental data and will
apply them into the eFT model for dependability assessments.
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Appendix
Algorithm 1 – Identify N such as PN converges to a rank-one
matrix
Step 1: N¼1
Step 2: Pdif ¼ P
ðNþ1Þ
trans 'P
N
trans
Step 3: Let Pdif ða; bÞ be the absolute value of the element at row
a-th and column b-th of the matrix Pdif.
If ∑ma ¼ 1∑
m
b ¼ 1jPdif ða; bÞjr10
'15, then STOP.
If NOT, N¼Nþ1 and returns to Step 2.
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